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Neuronal activity in dorsomedial 
and dorsolateral striatum under 
the requirement for temporal credit 
assignment
Eun Sil Her1,2,3, Namjung Huh1,4, Jieun Kim1,4 & Min Whan Jung1,2,3,4
To investigate neural processes underlying temporal credit assignment in the striatum, we recorded 
neuronal activity in the dorsomedial and dorsolateral striatum (DMS and DLS, respectively) of rats 
performing a dynamic foraging task in which a choice has to be remembered until its outcome is 
revealed for correct credit assignment. Choice signals appeared sequentially, initially in the DMS 
and then in the DLS, and they were combined with action value and reward signals in the DLS when 
choice outcome was revealed. Unlike in conventional dynamic foraging tasks, neural signals for chosen 
value were elevated in neither brain structure. These results suggest that dynamics of striatal neural 
signals related to evaluating choice outcome might differ drastically depending on the requirement for 
temporal credit assignment. In a behavioral context requiring temporal credit assignment, the DLS, but 
not the DMS, might be in charge of updating the value of chosen action by integrating choice, action 
value, and reward signals together.
Attributing an outcome to its causal action can be trivial when sensory information regarding the chosen action 
is available at the time that its outcome is revealed. Often, however, the consequence of an action is substantially 
delayed, and sensory information regarding the chosen action is unavailable when its outcome is revealed. In 
this case, one needs a memory trace to correctly attribute the outcome to its causal action. This is referred to as 
the temporal credit assignment problem1, which humans and animals encounter frequently in their daily lives. 
Despite its importance, however, its underlying neural mechanisms are poorly understood. Although a large 
body of studies has investigated neural processes related to action-outcome association and updating action value 
based on experienced outcomes2–7, sensory information regarding chosen action, including proprioceptive infor-
mation in many cases, was available when its outcome was revealed in almost all studies so far. This is in contrast 
to a large number of studies using the trace conditioning paradigm in which a sensory cue is paired with an out-
come over a temporal delay. As a result, we have limited understanding on neural mechanisms of attributing an 
outcome to its causal action across a temporal gap.
We investigated this issue in the dorsal striatum by employing a novel behavioral task for rats in which sen-
sory information regarding a chosen action is unavailable when its outcome is revealed. We have shown pre-
viously that choice signals persist differently in the dorsomedial (associative) and dorsolateral (sensorimotor) 
striatum (DMS and DLS, respectively) in rats. Specifically, choice signals persisted until the outcome of the next 
goal choice was revealed in the DMS, but not the DLS, in a dynamic foraging task in which keeping track of 
choices and their outcomes over multiple past trials was advantageous (‘dual assignment with hold’ task; reward 
probability increased as a function of consecutive alternative choices)8. This finding is consistent with numerous 
behavioral studies indicating roles of the DMS and DLS in response-outcome and stimulus-response associations, 
respectively9–13. We therefore expected that persistent choice signals that are necessary to attribute an outcome to 
its causal action would be carried by the DMS, but not the DLS, in the present behavioral task. To our surprise, 
choice signals appeared sequentially, initially in the DMS and then in the DLS. Moreover, neural signals necessary 
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to update the value of the chosen action converged in the DLS, but not the DMS, when the choice outcome was 
revealed. These results suggest that striatal neural processes underlying the evaluation of choice outcome vary 
widely depending on the requirement for temporal credit assignment.
Results
Behavior. Three rats were trained to perform a dynamic two-armed bandit (TAB) task on a Y-shaped maze 
(Fig. 1a). The animals were free to choose between two targets (left vs. right). Each choice was associated with 
different reward probabilities (12, 21, 63 or 72%) that were constant within a block of 40–75 trials (54.2 ± 6.5, 
mean ± SD), but changed across four blocks. No sensory cue was available to the animals for the block change 
so that the animals had to discover changes in reward probabilities by trial and error. A major difference from 
our previous dynamic foraging tasks6,14–17 was that reward was delivered not at the target locations, but after the 
animal went to the opposite end of the maze (reward location; ‘R’ in Fig. 1a) and waited for 1 s. Thus, no sensory 
information about the animal’s choice was available when the choice outcome was revealed. In this task, therefore, 
Figure 1. Animal behavior. (a) Behavioral task. In each trial, following a 2-s delay at the delay point  
(D), the animal was required to choose either the left or right target (T) by checking a photobeam sensor  
(blue dashed lines on top), return to the reward location (R, circle), and wait for 1 s to obtain the water reward. 
Approximate spatial positions for the divergence (outbound) and convergence (inbound) of left- and right-
choice-associated movement trajectories, which were determined separately for each session, are indicated as 
A (approach) and C (convergence), respectively (red dashed lines). (b) An example of movement trajectory 
for one session. Blue, left choice; red, right choice. Each dot represents the animal’s head position at 33.3 ms 
time resolution. (c) Determination of the convergence point. X-coordinates of the animal’s head position data 
were temporally aligned to the time point 3 s prior to the reward stage onset. The first time point when the 
difference in X-coordinates of the left- and right-choice trials became statistically insignificant (t-test, p > 0.05) 
and remained that way for at least nine consecutive points (300 ms) was determined as the convergence point 
(red vertical line). Top, X-coordinates of all left-choice and right-choice trials in an example session; middle, 
mean (± SD across trials) X-coordinates of the left-choice and right-choice trials of the same session; bottom, 
mean X-coordinates of the left-choice and right-choice trials were averaged across sessions (± SD). The data was 
aligned to the convergence point (time 0) that was determined separately for each session. (d) Choice behavior 
of one animal in one example session. Tick marks denote trial-by-trial choices of the animal (upper, left choice; 
lower, right choice; long, rewarded trial; short, unrewarded trial). Vertical lines denote block transitions and 
numbers on the top indicate mean reward probabilities associated with left and right choices in each block. The 
black line shows the probability to choose the left target (PL) in a moving average of 10 trials, and the gray line 
shows PL predicted by the hybrid model.
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the animals had to retain the information on the latest choice until its outcome was revealed in order to correctly 
associate a choice and its consequence (temporal credit assignment problem1). Figure 1b shows movement trajec-
tories of one animal during one example session. In all sessions, as shown in the example, the animal’s movement 
trajectories following left- vs. right-choices converged (Fig. 1c) around the midpoint of the central stem (‘C’ in 
Fig. 1a). The duration of the memory stage (the time period between the convergence of the animal’s movement 
trajectories and trial outcome), during which the animals had to retain the information regarding the chosen 
action for correct temporal credit assignment, was 1.92 ± 0.13 s (mean ± SD).
The animals completed the majority of the trials. The number of incomplete trials (returning to the reward 
location without checking a target sensor) was 1.7 ± 0.3 (0.8 ± 0.1%; mean ± SEM) per session. During the steady 
state (i.e., the last 10 trials in each block), the animals chose the higher reward-probability target in 62.8 ± 2.0% 
of the trials (comparison with 50% choice, p = 3.2 × 10−7; 67.1 ± 2.5% in 0.72:0.12 blocks and 58.4 ± 2.2% in 
0.63:0.21 blocks). This value is significantly lower compared to that in a conventional dynamic TAB task15 
(75.6 ± 7.9%; t-test, p = 2.9 × 10−8). Thus, the animals captured changes in reward probabilities and adjusted their 
choices accordingly even with a delay between a choice and its outcome (Fig. 1d), although their performance 
(in terms of choosing the higher reward-probability target) was significantly lower than in the conventional 
dynamic TAB task in which choice outcome was revealed at target locations.
Temporal profiles of neuronal activity. A total of 328 and 204 single units were recorded from the right 
DMS and DLS, respectively, from three rats (Fig. 2a). The recorded units were classified into putative medium 
spiny neurons (MSNs; DMS, n = 212; DLS, n = 140) and putative interneurons (DMS, n = 49; DLS, n = 41) based 
on mean discharge rates and spike widths8 (Fig. 2b), and we focused our analysis on putative MSNs. Activity 
of the putative MSNs (mean of z-normalized discharge rate) was higher initially in the DMS, but in the DLS in 
the later phase of a trial (Fig. 3). DMS neurons gradually decreased their activity from the approach stage onset 
Figure 2. Recording locations and unit classification. (a) Single units were recorded from the DMS and the 
DLS. The diagrams are coronal section views of three rat brains at 0.48 mm anterior to bregma. Each diagram 
represents one rat and each circle represents one recording site that was determined based on histology and 
electrode advancement history. One to six units were recorded simultaneously from each site. Modified from 
ref. 49 with permission from Elsevier. (b) Unit classification. Recorded units were classified into putative MSNs 
and putative interneurons based on mean discharge rate and spike width. Those units with mean firing rates 
< 6 Hz and spike widths ≥ 0.24 ms were classified as putative MSNs, and the rest were classified as putative 
interneurons.
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(see Methods for behavioral stages) until the reward stage onset, whereas DLS neurons rapidly increased their 
activity starting from the memory stage onset, which reached a peak at ~0.5 s before the reward stage onset 
(Fig. 3). The elevated DLS activity might be related to reward anticipation, such as the activity found in the ventral 
striatum18. Overall, DMS neurons showed higher activity before the memory stage onset, whereas DLS neurons 
showed higher activity after the memory stage onset, raising a possibility that the DMS and DLS might play more 
important roles in the early and late phases of a trial, respectively, in the present behavioral task.
Neural signals for choice and reward. We examined neural signals related to the animal’s choice (C), 
its outcome (i.e., reward; R), and their interaction (X) in the current (t) and two previous trials (t − 1 and t − 2) 
in a 500-ms time window that was advanced in 100-ms time steps based on a multiple linear regression analysis 
(see Methods). Figure 4a shows fractions of neurons significantly responsive to these behavioral variables 
[C(t − 2), R(t − 2), and X(t − 2) data are not shown because they were largely below chance level]. Advanced 
choice signals were weak in both DMS and DLS as reported previously8,14. Choice signals were elevated following 
the approach onset and stayed well above chance level in both brain structures, but were stronger in the DMS than 
the DLS. Once the animal passed through the convergence point (memory stage onset), however, DMS choice 
signals gradually decayed so that they fluctuated near chance level before and after the reward stage onset. By 
contrast, DLS choice signals initially went down below chance level after trajectory convergence, but arose above 
chance level ~700 ms before the animal arrived at the reward location and stayed well above chance level until ~1 s 
following the reward stage onset (Fig. 4a). Thus, choice signals were initially carried by the DMS after trajectory 
convergence, but the DLS took over this role as the animal reached the reward location.
Reward signals arose immediately after the reward stage onset in both areas, but the magnitude (i.e., fraction 
of neurons) was larger in the DLS than the DMS, which is consistent with a previous finding19. Examples of 
choice- and reward-responsive neurons are shown in Fig. 4b.
Previous choice signals were much weaker, but showed a similar trend (Fig. 4a). Previous choice signals were 
stronger in the DMS than the DLS in the early phase of a trial (early delay and approach stages), but stronger in 
the DLS than the DMS in the late phase (~0.5 s following the memory stage onset). Previous reward signals were 
somewhat stronger than previous choice signals. They were maintained above chance level until the memory 
stage onset in the DMS and until the approach stage onset in the DLS. Previous reward signals were significantly 
stronger in the DMS than the DLS, especially during the approach stage.
Neural signals for value. Neural signals for action value (QL and QR), that was estimated with a reinforce-
ment learning (RL) model, were overall weak before the animal returned to the reward site. However, action value 
signals in the DLS, but not the DMS, increased as the animal passed the convergence point and approached the 
reward location (~0.5 s after passing the convergence point). The elevated action value signals subsided ~1 s fol-
lowing the reward stage onset (Fig. 5a). Analyzing the 2-s time window centered around the reward stage onset, 
the fraction of neurons conveying at least one action value signal (QL or QR; t-test, p < 0.025) was significantly 
higher in the DLS than the DMS (20.7 and 9.0%, respectively; χ 2-test, p = 0.002). Chosen value (Qc) signals were 
much weaker than action value signals throughout the task. Examples of value-responsive neurons are shown in 
Fig. 5b.
Discussion
To investigate neural processes underlying temporal credit assignment in the striatum, we recorded DMS and 
DLS neuronal activity in a behavioral task in which chosen action has to be remembered until its outcome is 
revealed for correct attribution of the outcome to its causal action. To our surprise, DMS and DLS were sequen-
tially engaged in transmitting neural signals necessary to update the value of the chosen action. Choice signals 
were initially transmitted by the DMS, and subsequently by the DLS during the memory stage. Choice signals in 
the DLS were then combined with action value and reward signals after the outcome of the choice was revealed.
Figure 3. Temporal profiles of neuronal activity. Mean discharge rates of putative MSNs were compared 
between the DMS (red) and DLS (blue). The graphs show z-scores of discharge rates of putative MSNs across 
different behavioral stages (delay, approach to target, target selection, memory, and reward). A spike density 
function was constructed for each neuron by applying a Gaussian kernel (σ = 100 ms) and then z-normalized 
based on the mean and SD of discharge rate in 10-ms time bins. Shading indicates 95% confidence interval. 
Each solid vertical line indicates the beginning of a given behavioral stage. Dashed vertical lines denote delay 
stage offset (left) and the animal’s arrival at the reward location (right).
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Our results indicate that striatal information processing related to action outcome evaluation can be dras-
tically different depending on the requirement for temporal credit assignment. Sensory information regarding 
chosen action was available when its outcome was revealed in our previous dynamic foraging tasks8,14, and, not 
surprisingly, both DMS and DLS conveyed strong choice signals following the animal’s choice until the reward 
period. In these studies, chosen value signals arose as the animals approached the target locations and stayed 
above chance level for ~1 s after the choice outcome was revealed in both DMS and DLS, so that they were com-
bined with reward signals that arose steeply as soon as the choice outcome was revealed. These results suggest 
that both DMS and DLS were involved in updating the value of the chosen action in our previous dynamic 
foraging tasks19–20. The present results differ from our previous ones with respect to action evaluation in two 
major respects. First, neural signals necessary for value updating converged in the DLS, but not the DMS. There 
has been considerable interest in the roles of DMS and DLS in reward-based learning and decision making21–23. 
In particular, the DLS and DMS have been proposed to play roles in stimulus-response (habit formation) and 
response-outcome (goal-directed action selection) associations, respectively9–13,24,25. However, our results suggest 
that, under certain conditions that require temporal credit assignment, it is the DLS where signals necessary for 
response-outcome association converge. Note that this finding does not necessarily indicate the role of the DLS 
in response-outcome rather than stimulus-response association. Stimulus, response, and outcome signals are all 
necessary in order to strengthen (or weaken) stimulus-response association according to an outcome. The choice 
and outcome signals found in the DLS during the reward stage might be used for stimulus-response association.
The second major difference is that action value signals, instead of chosen value signals, were elevated at the 
time that choice outcome was revealed in the present study. Unlike in our previous studies8,14, strong chosen 
value signals were not observed when the choice outcome was revealed in the present study. The lack of strong 
chosen value signals might be an indication that neither the DMS nor the DLS is involved in updating the value 
of the chosen action in the present behavioral task. It is worth noting, however, that all the information necessary 
to update the value of the chosen action was available in the DLS when the choice outcome was revealed. Also, 
in computational models of reward-based learning in the striatum, striatal neurons most often do not directly 
represent the value of the chosen action but represent the value of a fixed specific action (e.g., refs 26,27). Thus, 
an alternative possibility is that the DLS updates the value of the chosen action by integrating neural signals for 
Figure 4. Neural activity related to the animal’s choice and its outcome. (a) Shown are fractions of DMS and 
DLS MSNs that significantly modulated their activity according to the animal’s choice (C), its outcome (R), and 
their interaction (X) in the current (t) and previous (t − 1) trials in a 500-ms time window that was advanced in 
100-ms time steps across different behavioral stages. Shading indicates chance level (binomial test, alpha = 0.05) 
for the DLS (7.86%), which is slightly higher than that for the DMS (7.55%). Large open circles indicate 
significantly different fractions (χ 2-test, p < 0.05) between DMS and DLS. Behavioral stages and vertical lines 
are as shown in Fig. 3. (b) Examples of MSNs responsive to animal’s choice (C) or its outcome (R) in the current 
trial (t). Top, spike raster plots. Each row is one trial, and each dot represents a spike. Bottom, spike density 
functions. Trials were divided into two groups according to the animal’s target choice (left vs. right) or reward 
(rewarded vs. unrewarded).
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the animal’s choice, action values, and reward in the present behavioral task. Neural processes for updating action 
value might vary depending on the availability of sensory information regarding the chosen action at the time 
that the choice outcome is revealed. When sensory information concerning the chosen action is available, it might 
selectively activate those striatal neurons encoding the value of the chosen (but not the unchosen) action, so that 
the chosen value and reward signals are combined to update the value of the chosen action. When this is not the 
case, all action value signals might arise and be integrated with “maintained” choice signals and reward signals. 
Striatum might selectively update the value of the chosen (but not the unchosen) action based on the combination 
of choice, action value, and reward signals when sensory information on the chosen action is unavailable at the 
time that the choice outcome is revealed.
Neural processes enabling temporal credit assignment are not yet well understood28,29. Temporal credit assign-
ment might be achieved by “tagging” synapses involved in action selection and modifying them later28,30. This 
might also be achieved by persistently maintaining the activity of those neurons involved in action selection until 
its outcome is revealed6,31,32. Previous studies have found prolonged choice signals for action-outcome associa-
tion in the form of persistent neural activity in different parts of the brain, including various sub-regions of the 
frontal cortex, striatum, and hippocampus6,31. However, these studies employed behavioral tasks in which sen-
sory information regarding the chosen action was available when its outcome was revealed, and hence were not 
designed to study the temporal credit assignment problem. For choice signals to be qualified as potential memory 
(or eligibility trace) signals for temporal credit assignment, persistent choice signals correlated with behavioral 
requirement of temporal credit assignment would be necessary. In this respect, we found sequentially appearing 
choice signals in the DMS and DLS during the time period the animal’s choice has to be remembered for correct 
credit assignment. It is possible that the sequentially appearing striatal choice signals have nothing to do with 
linking temporally discontiguous actions and their outcomes. For example, they might passively reflect neural 
Figure 5. Temporal profiles of value-related neural activity. (a) Shown are fractions of DMS and DLS MSNs 
that significantly modulated their activity according to left action value (QL), right action value (QR), and chosen 
value (QC). Analysis time windows and shading are as shown in Fig. 4a. (b) Two examples of DLS MSNs coding 
action value. Top, spike raster plots. Bottom, spike density functions. Trials were divided into four groups 
according to the level of QL (left) or QR (right).
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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activity in upstream brain structures (e.g., frontal cortices) that might be in charge of maintaining choice signals 
for temporal credit assignment. Nevertheless, our results raise the possibility that the DMS and DLS cooperate 
in transmitting choice signals during the memory stage for the purpose of temporal credit assignment. It has 
long been thought that the cortico-basal ganglia circuit consists of multiple parallel loops that serve distinct 
functions12,33,34. However, new anatomical studies indicate substantial cross-talk between different loops35–38 and 
physiological evidence for reciprocal interactions between the loops has been reported39,40. Our results raise the 
possibility that different cortico-striatal loops might cooperate under certain circumstances. Additional studies, 
such as employing specific manipulations of the DMS and the DLS in a task similar to the current one, might 
provide useful information on this issue.
It is notable that the DMS conveyed persistent choice signals until the reward stage in the next trial when it 
was advantageous for the animals to keep track of past choices and their outcomes (dual assignment with hold 
task8). We also found weak, but significantly stronger, DMS choice signals that persisted until the next trial in 
the current study (Fig. 4a), which is consistent with our previous findings14. Thus, the DMS tended to convey 
choice signals for a prolonged period across trials, especially when the information was necessary for optimal 
performance8. These results suggest that there might exist multiple mechanisms for temporal credit assignment. 
For linking a chosen action and its direct consequence over a temporal delay, as in the current behavioral setting, 
the DMS might cooperate with the DLS for action value updating. For linking a chosen action to its indirect 
consequences across multiple trials, as in the behavioral task used in our previous study (dual assignment with 
hold task8), the DMS might be in charge of maintaining choice information for a prolonged period. It has been 
proposed that different parts of the striatum concern reward prediction41 and action selection42 at different time 
scales. Clearly, further studies are needed to elucidate the roles of the DMS and the DLS (and other structures that 
are known to convey previous choice signals, as well) in temporal credit assignment under different behavioral 
settings.
Discharge rates of DMS and DLS neurons were higher in the early and late phases of a trial (before and after 
memory stage onset), respectively. These results raise the possibility that the DMS and DLS might play more 
important roles in different phases of a trial. Choice and action value signals were stronger in the DMS in the 
early phase of a trial and, conversely, they were stronger in the DLS in the late phase of a trial. Higher firing of DLS 
neurons in the late phase of a trial is consistent with the view that the DLS plays a more important role than the 
DMS in outcome evaluation in the present behavioral task. Note that our results (early/late activation of the DMS/
DLS within a trial) are not related to the previous finding of early/ate activation of the DMS/DLS in the course 
of learning a new task40. The animals were overtrained before unit recording, and similar results obtained when 
we divided the behavioral data into two halves (early and late sessions) and repeated the same analyses (data not 
shown). It is unclear what functions higher firing of DMS neurons during the early task phase is related to. Choice 
and action value signals were elevated in the DMS after behavioral manifestation of the animal’s target selection 
(after approach onset), suggesting that they are unlikely to be related to action selection22 or response vigor43. 
Additional studies are needed to understand whether and how these neural signals contribute to value-based 
decision making under the requirement for temporal credit assignment. It would be also important to explore 
interactions of the striatum with other brain structures, such as the hippocampus25, in dealing with the temporal 
credit assignment problem. For example, the striatum might be able to bridge a relatively short temporal gap 
between an action and its outcome, whereas the hippocampus might be necessary to handle the temporal credit 
assignment problem when the temporal gap between an action and its outcome is relative long.
Methods
Subjects. Three adult male Sprague Dawley rats (~10–12 weeks old, 300–350 g) were individually housed in 
a colony room and initially allowed free access to food and water for one week. They were then subjected to water 
deprivation with free access to food and extensive handling for 5–7 d. Their body weights were maintained at > 
80% ad libitum throughout the experiments. Experiments were conducted in the dark phase of a 12 h light/dark 
cycle. All animal care and experimental procedures were performed in accordance with protocols approved by 
the directives of the Animal Care and Use Committee of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology 
(Daejeon, Korea).
Behavioral task. The animals performed a dynamic TAB task in a Y-shaped maze (Fig. 1a). They were 
allowed to choose freely between two targets for water reward. Each trial began when the animal arrived at the 
delay position (‘D’ in Fig. 1a) from the reward location (proximal end of the maze; ‘R’ in Fig. 1a). The connecting 
bridge (distal segment of the central stem) was lowered 2 s following the animal’s arrival at the delay position, 
allowing the animal to move forward. When the animal’s snout broke the photobeam at either target site (distal 
parts of the Y-maze; ‘T’ in Fig. 1a), an auditory tone (left target, 4.3 kHz; right target, 4.5 kHz) was delivered dur-
ing the period of photobeam-breaking to signal that a choice was successfully completed. The outcome of a choice 
was revealed only after the animal came back to the reward location (R) and waited there for 1 s. Trial outcome was 
also signaled by an auditory tone (100 ms, 1 and 9 kHz for positive and negative outcomes, different across rats) 
so that onset of water delivery and the positive auditory tone coincided. A new trial began as soon as the animal 
arrived at the delay position without an inter-trial interval.
Each session consisted of four blocks, and each block consisted of 40–75 trials (54.2 ± 6.5, mean ± SD; first 
block, 40 plus a number randomly chosen between 0 and 20; the other blocks, 45 plus a number randomly chosen 
between 0 and 30). The sequence of block reward probabilities (four combinations, 0.72:0.12, 0.12:0.72, 0.63:0.21, 
and 0.21:0.63) was randomly determined with the constraint that the higher reward probability target always 
changed its location across adjacent blocks. A fixed amount of water (30 μ l) was delivered stochastically in each 
trial according to the block reward probability of the chosen target.
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Behavioral stages. We focused our analysis on five behavioral stages. The delay stage is the first 2 s period of 
each trial, during which the animal was waiting for the connecting bridge to be lowered. The animal’s arrival at the 
delay position (‘D’ in Fig. 1a) was detected by a photobeam sensor that triggered the lowering of the bridge after a 
2-s delay. The approach stage is between the first behavioral manifestation of the animal’s choice (its approximate 
position is indicated by ‘A’ in Fig. 1a) and activating a photobeam sensor at either target site (T). For each session, 
left- and right-choice-associated head positions were aligned temporally to the offset of the delay stage, and the 
time point when the X-coordinates of the left- and right-choice trials first became significantly different (t-test, 
p < 0.05) and remained that way for at least 100 ms was determined as the onset of the approach stage14. The selec-
tion stage started with the animal’s activating a target photobeam sensor (i.e., offset of the approach stage) and 
ended when the animal’s left- and right-choice trajectories converged. The stem of the maze was narrow (5 cm) 
and long (70 cm), which made the animal’s body position independent of the animal’s target choice around the 
midpoint of the central stem (‘C’ in Fig. 1a). The memory stage is between the time of trajectory convergence and 
the time that the trial outcome was revealed. Thus, the memory stage included a 1 s waiting period at the reward 
location (‘R’ in Fig. 1a). The onset of the memory stage was determined separately for each session. For this, we 
temporally aligned left- and right-choice-associated head positions to the time point 3 s prior to the reward stage 
onset. The time point when the difference in x coordinates of the left- and right-choice trials first became statis-
tically insignificant (t-test, p > 0.05) and remained that way for at least 100 ms was determined as the onset of the 
memory stage. The reward stage is between the offset of the memory stage (which coincided with the onset of a 
positive/negative auditory cue and water delivery in positive outcome trials) and the beginning of the next trial 
(i.e., onset of the next delay stage). The duration of the reward stage was 14.92 ± 0.43 and 6.43 ± 0.25 s in rewarded 
and unrewarded trials, respectively. Thus, the animal’s behavior was different depending on the choice outcome 
especially during the later phase of the reward stage.
Models of behavior. We used a hybrid model containing simple RL and win-stay-lose-switch terms44–46. 
This model was superior to the models containing only the RL or win-stay-lose-switch term (smaller values of 
Akaike’s and Bayesian information criteria). For the chosen action ‘a’, the action value (qa(t + 1)) was updated as 
follows:
α+ = + ⋅ −q t q t R t q t( 1) ( ) ( ( ) ( )), (1)a a a
where α is the learning rate; and R(t) is the reward (1 if rewarded, and 0 otherwise) in the t-th trial. The total 
action value (Qa(t + 1)), including the action value and the win-stay-lose-switch term, was represented as follows:
+ = + + =
+ = + +
Q t q t a if R t
Q t q t a else
( 1) ( 1) ( ) 1,
( 1) ( 1) , (2)
a a WS
a a LS
where αWS and αLS are win-stay and lose-switch terms, respectively. The action value for the unchosen action did 
not change across trials. Choices were made according to the softmax action selection rule as follows:
β γ
=
+ − − −
p t
Q t Q t
( ) 1
1 exp( ( ( ) ( ) ))
,
(3)L L R
where pL(t) is the probability for selecting the left goal; β is the inverse temperature that determines the degree of 
randomness in action selection; and γ is a bias to select the right target. Model parameters for each rat are shown 
in Table 1.
Unit recording. Single units were recorded simultaneously from the right DMS (center of the tetrode bundle, 
0.5 mm anterior, and 2.0 mm lateral to bregma; 3.4–5.0 mm ventral to brain surface) and DLS (0.5 mm ante-
rior and 4.0 mm lateral to bregma; 3.4–5.6 mm ventral to brain surface) with 15 tetrodes (7 or 8 in each region; 
Fig. 2a). For comparison with previous results, units were recorded in the same coordinates as in our previous 
study8. Tetrode fabrication and unit recording procedures are described in our previous study14. Briefly, unit 
signals were amplified 5000–10000× , band pass-filtered between 600–6000 Hz, digitized at 32 kHz, and stored 
on a personal computer using a Cheetah data acquisition system (Neuralynx). Unit signals were recorded with 
the animals placed on a pedestal for ~5 min before and after each experimental session to examine stability of 
recorded units. The head position of the rat was also recorded at 30 Hz by tracking an array of light emitting 
diodes mounted on the headstage. Small marking lesions were made by passing electrolytic current (30 μ A, 20 s, 
cathodal) through one channel of each tetrode at the end of the final recording, and electrode tracks and lesions 
were verified under a fluorescent microscope as previously described47.
α αWS αLS β γ
Rat #1 0.033 − 0.261 − 0.334 1.794 0.180
Rat #2 0.072 − 2.249 − 2.555 0.349 0.505
Rat #3 0.106 0.318 − 0.043 1.467 0.176
Table 1.  Parameters of the RL model for each rat. α, learning rate; αWS, win-stay coefficient; αLS, lose-switch 
coefficient; β, inverse temperature; γ, choice bias toward the right target.
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Isolation and classification of units. Single units were isolated by manually clustering various spike wave-
form parameters using MClust software (A. R. Redish). The identity of a unit was determined based on the clus-
tering pattern of spike waveform parameters, average spike waveforms, mean discharge rates, autocorrelograms, 
and inter-spike-interval histograms. Only those clusters with no inter-spike interval < 2 ms, L-ratio < 0.2, isola-
tion distance > 1548, and the number of spikes > 500 were included in the analysis. Unstable units (magnitudes of 
average spike waveforms recorded before and after an experimental session differed by > 10%) were also excluded 
from the analysis.
The recorded units were classified based on average firing rates and spike widths during the recording sessions 
according to our previous criteria8. Those units with mean firing rates < 6 Hz and spike widths ≥ 0.24 ms were 
classified as putative MSNs, and the rest were classified as putative interneurons (Fig. 2b). Only putative MSNs 
(DMS: n = 212; DLS: n = 140) were included in the analysis. The mean ( ± SEM) firing rate and spike width 
of putative MSNs were 0.63 ± 0.05 Hz and 0.331 ± 0.003 ms in the DMS, respectively, and 0.81 ± 0.06 Hz and 
0.331 ± 0.004 ms in the DLS, respectively.
Multiple regression analysis. Neuronal activity related to the animal’s choice and its outcome was ana-
lyzed using the following regression model:
∑ ε= + − + − + − +
=






where S(t) indicates spike discharge rate in a given analysis window, C(t), R(t), and X(t) represent the animal’s 
choice (left or right; dummy variable, − 1 or 1), its outcome (reward or no reward; dummy variable, 1 or − 1), 
and their interaction (choice × outcome; dummy variable, − 1 or 1), respectively, in trial t, a0~a3 are regression 
coefficients, and ε(t) is the error term.
Neuronal activity related to action value and chosen value was analyzed with the following regression model:
ε= + + + + + + +S t a a C t a R t a X t a Q t a Q t a Q t t( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), (5)L R C0 1 2 3 4 5 6
where QL(t) and QR(t) denote left and right total action values, respectively, and Qc(t) indicates the chosen value in 
trial t that was estimated using the hybrid model. Correlations among the regressors are summarized in Table 2.
Statistical tests. Student’s t-tests (two-tailed) were used to examine the significance of a regression coeffi-
cient and the difference between left- and right-choice-associated head positions. A binomial test was used to test 
the significance of the fraction of neurons for a given variable, and a χ 2-test was used to examine the significance 
of the difference in the fraction of neurons between the DLS and the DMS. A p value < 0.05 was used as the cri-
terion for a significant statistical difference, and all data are expressed as mean ± SEM unless noted otherwise.
References
1. Sutton, R. S. & Barto, A. G. Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998).
2. Schultz, W. Multiple reward signals in the brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 1, 199–207 (2000).
3. Maren, S. Neurobiology of Pavlovian fear conditioning. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 24, 897–931 (2001).
4. Doya, K. Modulators of decision making. Nat. Neurosci. 11, 410–416 (2008).
5. Rangel, A., Camerer, C. & Montague, P. R. A framework for studying the neurobiology of value-based decision making. Nat. Rev. 
Neurosci. 9, 545–556 (2008).
6. Lee, D., Seo, H. & Jung, M. W. Neural basis of reinforcement learning and decision making. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 35, 287–308 (2012).
7. Hikosaka, O., Kim, H. F., Yasuda, M. & Yamamoto, S. Basal ganglia circuits for reward value-guided behavior. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 
37, 289–306 (2014).
C(t) R(t) X(t) C(t − 1) R(t − 1) X(t − 1)
C(t) 1 − 0.008 − 0.109 − 0.091 − 0.096 0.136
R(t) − 0.022 1 0.104 − 0.041 7.43 × 10−5 0.021
X(t) − 0.120 0.106 1 0.065 0.051 0.268
C(t − 1) − 0.150 − 0.033 0.063 1 − 0.008 − 0.109
R(t − 1) − 0.105 − 0.023 0.059 − 0.022 1 0.105
X(t − 1) 0.140 0.030 0.258 − 0.118 0.107 1
C(t) R(t) X(t) QL(t) QR(t) QC(t)
C(t) 1 − 0.008 − 0.109 − 0.224 0.218 − 0.071
R(t) − 0.022 1 0.104 0.001 0.052 0.107
X(t) − 0.120 0.106 1 − 0.037 0.038 0.043
QL(t) − 0.253 0.002 − 0.020 1 − 0.191 0.192
QR(t) 0.253 0.049 0.022 − 0.259 1 0.463
QC(t) − 0.087 0.095 0.049 0.155 0.430 1
Table 2.  Correlations among regressors. Shown are Pearson’s correlation coefficients between explanatory 
variables used in the multiple linear regression models. Top, regression model 1 (eq. 4); bottom, regression 
model 2 (eq. 5). Lower diagonal, DMS; upper diagonal, DLS.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
1 0Scientific RepoRts | 6:27056 | DOI: 10.1038/srep27056
8. Kim, H., Lee, D. & Jung, M. W. Signals for previous goal choice persist in the dorsomedial, but not dorsolateral striatum of rats. 
J. Neurosci. 33, 52–63 (2013).
9. Yin, H. H. & Knowlton, B. J. The role of the basal ganglia in habit formation. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 7, 464–476 (2006).
10. Balleine, B. W., Liljeholm, M. & Ostlund, S. B. The integrative function of the basal ganglia in instrumental conditioning. Behav. 
Brain Res. 199, 43–52 (2009).
11. White, N. M. Some highlights of research on the effects of caudate nucleus lesions over the past 200 years. Behav. Brain Res. 199, 
3–23 (2009).
12. Redgrave, P. et al. Goal-directed and habitual control in the basal ganglia: implications for Parkinson’s disease. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 
11, 760–772 (2010).
13. Devan, B. D., Hong, N. S. & McDonald, R. J. Parallel associative processing in the dorsal striatum: segregation of stimulus-response 
and cognitive control subregions. Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 96, 95–120 (2011).
14. Kim, H., Sul, J. H., Huh, N., Lee, D. & Jung, M. W. Role of striatum in updating values of chosen actions. J. Neurosci. 29, 14701–14712 
(2009).
15. Huh, N., Jo, S., Kim, H., Sul, J. H. & Jung, M. W. Model-based reinforcement learning under concurrent schedules of reinforcement 
in rodents. Learn. Mem. 16, 315–323 (2009).
16. Sul, J. H., Kim, H., Huh, N., Lee, D. & Jung, M. W. Distinct roles of rodent orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal cortex in decision 
making. Neuron 66, 449–460 (2010).
17. Sul, J. H., Jo, S., Lee, D. & Jung, M. W. Role of rodent secondary motor cortex in value-based action selection. Nat. Neurosci. 14, 
1202–1208 (2011).
18. Khamassi, M., Mulder, A. B., Tabuchi, E., Douchamps, V. & Wiener S. I. Anticipatory reward signals in ventral striatal neurons of 
behaving rats. Eur. J. Neurosci. 28, 1849–1866 (2008).
19. Kimchi, E. Y., Torregrossa, M. M., Taylor, J. R. & Laubach, M. Neuronal correlates of instrumental learning in the dorsal striatum. 
J. Neurophysiol. 102, 475–89 (2009).
20. Stalnaker, T. A., Calhoon, G. G., Ogawa, M., Roesch, M. R. & Schoenbaum, G. Neural correlates of stimulus-response and response-
outcome associations in dorsolateral versus dorsomedial striatum. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 4, 12 (2010).
21. Voorn, P., Vanderschuren, P. L., Groenewegen, H. J., Robbins, T. W. & Pennartz, C. M. Putting a spin on the dorsal-ventral divide of 
the striatum. Trends Neurosci. 27, 468–474 (2004).
22. Balleine, B. W., Delgado, M. R. & Hikosaka, O. The role of the dorsal striatum in reward and decision-making. J. Neurosci. 27, 
8161–8165 (2007).
23. Samejima, K. & Doya, K. Multiple representations of belief states and action values in corticobasal ganglia loops. Ann. NY Acad. Sci. 
1104, 213–228 (2007).
24. Dolan, R. J. & Dayan, P. Goals and habits in the brain. Neuron 80, 312–325 (2013).
25. Khamassi, M. & Humphries, M. D. Integrating cortico-limbic-basal ganglia architectures for learning model-based and model-free 
navigation strategies. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 6, 79 (2012).
26. Khamassi, M., Martinet, L.-E. & Guillot, A. Combining Self-Organizing Maps with Mixture of Experts: Application to an Actor-
Critic Model of Reinforcement Learning in the Basal Ganglia in From Animals to Animats 9 Vol. 4095, 394–405 (Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer-Verlag, 2006).
27. Dollé, L., Khamassi, M., Girard, B., Guillot, A. & Chavarriaga, R. (2008). Analyzing interactions between navigation strategies using 
a computational model of action selection in Spatial Cognition VI. Learning, Reasoning, and Talking about Space Vol. 5248, 71–86 
(Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2006).
28. Izhikevich, E. M. Solving the distal reward problem through linkage of STDP and dopamine signaling. Cereb. Cortex 17, 2443–2452 
(2007).
29. Pawlak, V., Wickens, J. R., Kirkwood, A. & Kerr, J. N. Timing is not everything: neuromodulation opens the STDP gate. Front. 
Synaptic Neurosci. 2, 146 (2010).
30. Cassenaer, S. & Laurent, G. Conditional modulation of spike-timing-dependent plasticity for olfactory learning. Nature 482, 47–52 
(2012).
31. Curtis, C. E. & Lee, D. Beyond working memory: the role of persistent activity in decision making. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 216–222 
(2010).
32. Bernacchia, A., Seo, H., Lee, D. & Wang, X. J. A reservoir of time constants for memory traces in cortical neurons. Nat. Neurosci. 14, 
366–372 (2011).
33. Alexander, G. E., DeLong, M. R. & Strick, P. L. Parallel organization of functionally segregated circuits linking basal ganglia and 
cortex. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 9, 357–381 (1986).
34. Alexander, G. E. & Crutcher, M. D. Functional architecture of basal ganglia circuits: neural substrates of parallel processing. Trends 
Neurosci. 13, 266–271 (1990).
35. Joel, D. & Weiner, I. The organization of the basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits: open interconnected rather than closed 
segregated. Neuroscience 63, 363–379 (1994).
36. Zheng, T. & Wilson, C. J. Corticostriatal combinatorics: the implications of corticostriatal axonal arborizations. J. Neurophysiol. 87, 
1007–1017 (2002).
37. Haber, S. N. & Knutson, B. The reward circuit: linking primate anatomy and human imaging. Neuropsychopharmacol. 35, 4–26 
(2010).
38. Mailly, P., Aliane, V., Groenewegen, H. J., Haber, S. N. & Deniau, J. M. The rat prefrontostriatal system analyzed in 3D: evidence for 
multiple interacting functional units. J. Neurosci. 33, 5718–5727 (2013).
39. Kasanetz, F., Riquelme, L. A., Della-Maggiore, V., O’Donnell, P. & Murer, M. G. Functional integration across a gradient of 
corticostriatal channels controls UP state transitions in the dorsal striatum. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 105, 8124–8129 (2008).
40. Thorn, C. A., Atallah, H., Howe, M. & Graybiel, A. M. Differential dynamics of activity changes in dorsolateral and dorsomedial 
striatal loops during learning. Neuron 66, 781–795 (2010).
41. Tanaka, S. C. et al. Prediction of immediate and future rewards differentially recruits cortico-basal ganglia loops. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 
887–893 (2004).
42. Ito, M. & Doya, K. Distinct neural representation in the dorsolateral, dorsomedial, and ventral parts of the striatum during fixed- 
and free-choice tasks. J. Neurosci. 35, 3499–3514 (2015).
43. Wang, A. Y., Miura, K. & Uchida, N. The dorsomedial striatum encodes net expected return, critical for energizing performance 
vigor. Nat. Neurosci. 16, 639–647 (2013).
44. Worthy, D. A. & Maddox, W. T. A comparison model of reinforcement-learning and win-stay-lose-shift decision-making processes: 
a tribute to W.K. Estes. J. Math. Psychol. 59, 41–49 (2014).
45. Kwak, S. et al. Role of dopamine D2 receptors in optimizing choice strategy in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Front. Behav. 
Neurosci. 8, 368 (2014).
46. Kim, K.-U., Huh, N., Jang, Y., Lee, D. & Jung, M. W. Effects of fictive reward on rat’s choice behavior. Sci. Rep. 5, 8040 (2015).
47. Baeg, E. H. et al. Fast spiking and regular spiking neural correlates of fear conditioning in the medial prefrontal cortex of the rat. 
Cereb. Cortex 11, 441–451 (2001).
48. Schmitzer-Torbert, N., Jackson, J., Henze, D., Harris, K. & Redish, A. D. Quantitative measures of cluster quality for use in 
extracellular recordings. Neuroscience 131, 1–11 (2005).
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
1 1Scientific RepoRts | 6:27056 | DOI: 10.1038/srep27056
49. Paxinos, G. & Watson, C. The Rat Brain in Stereotaxic Coordinates 4th edn, (Academic Press, San Diego, 1998).
Acknowledgements
We thank Daeyeol Lee for his helpful comments on the initial manuscript. This work was supported by the 
Research Center Program of the Institute for Basic Science (IBS-R002-G1) to M.W.J.
Author Contributions
E.S.H. and M.W.J. designed the study, E.S.H. performed the experiments, E.S.H., N.H. and J.K. analyzed the data, 
and M.W.J. wrote the manuscript with inputs from all authors.
Additional Information
Competing financial interests: The authors declare no competing financial interests.
How to cite this article: Her, E. S. et al. Neuronal activity in dorsomedial and dorsolateral striatum under the 
requirement for temporal credit assignment. Sci. Rep. 6, 27056; doi: 10.1038/srep27056 (2016).
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The images 
or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, 
unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license, 
users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material. To view a copy of this 
license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
